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 Recent years have seen two important shifts in international attitudes towards military 
interventions for human rights and humanitarian purposes, especially among the leadership of the UN 
and Western nations.  The traditional peacekeeping principle of “neutrality” has lost ground to 
“impartiality.”  In addition, there is growing acceptance of an international “responsibility to protect” 
civilians threatened with grave human rights abuses.  Both conceptual shifts represent a concern to 
make peacekeeping, especially UN peacekeeping, more assertive.  But their relationship is not simple.  
 The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’ (the “Brahimi Report”) first 
explanation of “impartiality” is in terms of a peace agreement to be upheld: “where one party to a peace 
agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by 
the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to 
complicity with evil.”2 Later, however, impartiality is explained in more explicitly moral, human rights 
protection terms: “Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties... In 
some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims.”  In such 
cases, impartiality means using force to “oppose obvious evil.”3  The easy shift between the language 
of mandates and peace terms and aggression and evil on the other – a feature of many discussions of 
impartiality, not just the Brahimi Report –  implies that using force to support a peace agreement and 
using force to protect civilians are equivalent.  I will argue that they are not equivalent, and in fact will 
often not even be compatible.   
 The Brahimi Report overlooks the possibility that supporting the terms of a peace agreement 
may amount to complicity with evil.  Peace agreements are not concluded with the input of all the 
people affected – they are negotiated between belligerent parties.  The people in general have a strong 
interest in an end to violence and the egregious human rights abuses that accompany it.  But we should 
not ignore the fact that upholding a peace agreement may mean creating or buttressing a political 
situation in which many people are subject to tyranny by armed minorities; conversely, putting peace 
on hold until a fully just political solution can be found may perpetuate serious violence.   
This incompatibility is important to our moral thinking about peacekeeping and humanitarian 
intervention:  The “responsibility to protect” is attractive because it is the more clearly moral idea.  It 
charges the international community, when all else has failed, with taking over a delinquent or 
impotent state’s duty of protecting its citizens.  By force, if necessary.  Impartiality’s narrower sense is 
a less immediately exciting concept that has to do with the attitude of a peace operation towards the 
parties to a conflict.  It charges the intervention force with acting assertively to support the peace 
agreement or other political process in place to end the conflict.  The shift towards impartiality as a 
standard (from the older concept of “neutrality,” which required an even hand, even towards parties 
that violated a peace agreement) should be welcomed.  Unfortunately, taking impartiality seriously may 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Nancy Gallagher, Joshua Smith, and Jason Terry for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
piece. 
2 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York: United 
Nations, 2000), ix. 
3 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 9. 
2 
force us to scale down our expectations regarding how far at least the military aspect a peace operation 
can go in terms of protecting people. 
Some Preliminaries 
 Despite the fact that current discussions of impartiality and the responsibility to protect center 
on UN peacekeeping, they are relevant to non-UN operations as well.  I would therefore like to cast a 
relatively wide net in terms of the kind of military operation one should have in mind while reading the 
remainder of this essay.  I will use the term “peace operation” to mean the full sweep of international 
military interventions in support of peace, human rights, or humanitarian concerns.  In particular, I 
intend the term to cover the range of operations from traditional, UN-based, interstate peacekeeping 
through humanitarian interventions (or, at least, operations like NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign in 
Kosovo or the US’ 2003 invasion of Iraq that make some claim at the mantle – my goal here is not to 
enter the debate over whether any given operation was a genuine humanitarian intervention or even 
whether there can be such things, interesting as that question is). 
 Most peace operations, so defined, are complex affairs.  When we consider the whole sweep of 
diplomatic, humanitarian, and military tools ideally at their disposal, the prospects for both upholding a 
peace agreement and protecting human rights may be fairly good.  But different elements of an 
international presence will typically have differing abilities fulfill these goals.  This essay will focus 
specifically on the military element of peace operations, and that is how the term should be understood 
in what follows, unless otherwise noted. 
 Finally, I would like to focus on the relatively early phases of an intervention, when establishing 
a basically viable peace is the primary concern.  In peacekeeping operations, this is generally the initial 
military phase, and the first task of the peacekeeping force entering after an agreement is in place.  In 
the case of a humanitarian intervention, where mass human rights abuses (e.g., genocide) are actually 
underway military force may be used to interpose itself between victims and aggressors, defeat major 
violent groups on the battlefield, or carry out “regime change” on an abusive government.  Peace 
enforcement, peace making, etc. may fall somewhere in the middle.  In any event, I am concerned with 
what happens after any element of the conflict that may be structured more like conventional warfare 
(i.e., focused on military defeat of a major combatant), but when military force is still necessary to 
support a fragile political process and deter or defeat potential spoilers. 
 While this may seem limited, the short- to medium-term military elements of a peace operation 
are crucial.  First, because international forces are often deployed with the idea that military force is the 
way to protect innocent people in some crisis, making military force an important instrument of the 
responsibility to protect.  Second, decisions made during the early phases of a peace operation, when 
peace must be secured to allow other elements to operate, can shape the progress of the rest of the 
intervention. 
I will begin by explaining the concepts of impartiality and the responsibility to protect more 
fully, as well as why they may come into conflict.  I then argue that, in general, peace operations have 
good reason to focus their military activities on impartially supporting the peace agreement  rather than 
directly seeking to protect the people, when the goals conflict.  Finally, I will argue that we should 
understand the dangers of peace agreements in terms of the possibility of “domination,” and how the 
international community might design peace operations’ mandates so as to mitigate their possible 
dominating effects, even if not eliminate them.  
3 
The Two Concepts 
 “Impartiality” and the “responsibility to protect” are not always used in clear or unequivocal 
ways, and this lack of clarity may sometimes make them seem more easily combined than they are. 
Impartiality 
 The Brahimi Report explicitly contrasts “impartiality” with “neutrality,” in a way that echoes  a 
distinction made by Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette in June 2000:  
Impartiality is not the same as neutrality. Of course, United Nations forces must apply impartially the 
mandate given them by the Security Council. But that is not at all the same as being neutral between 
parties that obey that mandate and those that resist it, or between those who respect international 
humanitarian and human rights law, and those who grossly violate it.4  
 The concept of impartiality outlined in these comments shares with neutrality the idea that 
peacekeepers do not take the side of any party to the conflict.  Yet impartial peacekeepers do take a 
side, after a fashion – they are on the side of the peace process, of the UN Charter, and of international 
law. 
 The distinction between neutrality and impartiality is not always made clear, and the two terms 
are still sometimes used in a sense that implies that they are synonymous.5  To the extent that some 
understand impartiality as another word for traditional neutrality, it is clearly incompatible with 
assertive protection of civilians from parties to the conflict, and so not of particular interest to my 
discussion.  A stronger understanding of impartiality, even if not universally accepted, is influential in 
part because it promises the moral advantage of not requiring peacekeepers to stand by as spoiler 
groups overrun a peace process or commit human rights abuses. 
 On the other hand, as I noted above, impartiality is sometimes used in a very strong sense that 
goes beyond even-handed implementation of the explicit mandate.  One peacekeeping desk officer 
expressed the view that the shift from neutrality to impartiality represents a “pressure to ‘take the side 
of the population’ and act against whoever abuses them.”6  Understanding impartiality as a blanket 
principle of defending civilians and human rights threatens to broaden it too far to leave it a distinct 
concept.   Tying impartiality to a notion of universal right unconnected to any agreement among the 
parties would make “impartiality” a matter of the intervening force simply taking the “side” of its own 
conception of what the right outcome would be. 
 A robust, but narrower concept of impartiality as a willingness to take military action against 
any party that violates the peace process also comports better with a focus on the “primacy of the peace 
process” that characterizes contemporary thinking about peace operations planning.  As Michael 
Dziedzic and Len Hawley put it, a peace operation should take the position that “we support those who 
support the peace process and actively oppose those who obstruct it.”7  Hereinafter, when I use the term 
                                                 
4 Louise Fréchette, “Deputy Secretary-General Describes ‘Changing Landscape’ of Peacekeeping in Ottawa Address,” 
United Nations Press Release DSG/SM/96, 8 June 2000, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000608.dsgsm96.doc.html (accessed on October 27, 2006). 
5 See, e.g., the excellent discussion of the history and use of the terms since 1998 in Dominick Donald, “Neutrality, 
Impartiality, and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century,” International Peacekeeping 9 No. 4 (2002), 
23-31. 
6 Donald, 33. 
7 Michael J. Dziedzic and Len Hawley, “Introduction,” in Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., 
The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 16. 
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“impartiality” I will mean it in this narrower sense, unless otherwise noted. 
 The understanding of impartiality as being on the side of a peace process is closely tied to the 
traditional principle that there can be no peacekeeping without a peace to keep.  As such, it may appear 
irrelevant to military interventions that, unlike traditional peacekeeping, are not undertaken in support 
of an existing peace process.  This appearance is mistaken.  While the discussion of impartiality vs. 
neutrality has largely taken place in the context of UN peacekeeping missions, the concept is relevant 
to non-UN peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention as well. 
 Many peace operations, such as the US/UN intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s, France’s 
Operation Turquoise in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, or the US’ current 
counterinsurgency/stability operation in Iraq, will not enter a situation in which there is an existing 
peace agreement or process to be upheld.  Nonetheless, as the US’ difficulties in Iraq demonstrate, such 
operations are doomed unless some political solution to the conflict is in view.  Regardless of what one 
might think of the US’ motives in invading Iraq, merely toppling the government of Saddam Hussein 
was insufficient to achieve any meaningful goals – a political process that reconciles various factions is 
the only way that Iraq will ever reach a stable state that would allow the US to withdraw with any 
prospect of “success,” however defined.  Similarly, while Operation Turquoise was able to protect a 
good number of Rwandan civilians,8 it would have been impossible for the French to conclude the 
mission with any confidence of their continued safety had the Rwandan Patriotic Front not achieved a 
political (though violent) solution by installing a new government in Rwanda. 
 Such non-peacekeeping peace operations need to give some (if only aspirational) political 
process a role in their planning similar to that played by the peace agreement in a peacekeeping 
operation.  Military victory should not be seen as an end in itself, but rather as a way of supporting that 
political process.  And that means that impartiality, in an expanded sense, is relevant to the conduct of 
any peace operation.  To the extent that an intervening nation or organization is able to claim the 
mantle of a peace operation, rather than mere conquest, it should not be on the side of any particular 
faction in the situation into which it is intervening (nor should it itself constitute a faction pursuing its 
own narrow interests).  Impartial military force should be used to support the political process by 
punishing or thwarting groups that would upset it. 
The Responsibility to Protect 
 The fully-formed concept of a “responsibility to protect” comes the 2001 report of the same 
name by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).9  It has since 
been endorsed by the UN in the report of the high-level panel on threats, challenges, and change, A 
More Secure World,10 Secretary-General Annan’s In Larger Freedom,11 and at the General Assembly's 
                                                 
8 Though France is (justly) criticized for protecting fleeing Hutu genocidaires, the intervention also protected large 
numbers of Tutsi targets of the genocide.  See J. Matthew Vaccaro, “The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and 
Disaster Relief in Rwanda,” in William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 
1990s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 398. 
9 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Center, 2001). 
10 United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility (UN Document number A/59/565, New York: United Nations, 2004), 57. 
11 Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All (UN Document number 
A/59/2005, New York: United Nations, 2005), 35. 
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2005 World Summit.12
 The responsibility to protect is most often invoked in discussions of whether the international 
community or a member thereof should intervene in a state’s internal affairs.  For the purposes of this 
essay, I set that question aside, but the responsibility to protect concept also has implications for how a 
peace operation should conduct itself once intervention is decided upon. 
 The core of the responsibility to protect is the idea that sovereignty is not simply (or even 
primarily) a set of powers and prerogatives, but rather a responsibility.  Sovereign states are responsible 
for “protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare.”13  When a state cannot 
or will not do so, the international community bears a residual responsibility to take up the slack – by 
military intervention, if necessary (though military action should always be a last resort). 
 The report’s criteria for military intervention, in particularly the requirement of “right 
intention,” also have implications for the proper conduct of an intervention.  For an intervention to be 
justified, its “primary purpose” must be to “halt or avert human suffering.”14  The report is clear that 
this “intention” has more to do with the conduct of the intervention than the motives of intervening 
states, which may be partly or even mostly self-interested.  What is important is that military actions 
such as the overthrow of a government or the occupation of territory be undertaken only as necessary to 
the overall goal of protection, and that all military action be focused on the “human needs of those 
seeking protection or assistance.”15
 Interestingly, the ICISS report sometimes seems to conceive of the responsibility to defend the 
welfare of the people at least in part in terms of the threatened population’s own view of their interests.    
One way it suggests for checking that the criterion of “right intention” is fulfilled is to see whether “the 
intervention is actually supported by the people for whose benefit the intervention is intended,”16 and a 
virtue of the responsibility to protect concept is that it requires intervening states to suppress their own 
interests in favor of “an evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those seeking or needing 
support.”17  As we will see, this will have implications for peace operations, because seeing things 
from “the people’s” view is a conceptually difficult task. 
 The bottom line is that a peace operation discharging its responsibility to protect some 
population should be “on the side” of the people, in the sense of protecting their fundamental rights and 
interests (whether as understood by the people themselves or in some more objective sense). 
Connects and Dis- 
 Both the shift towards impartiality and the increasing acceptance of a responsibility to protect 
are driven in part by a concern with the international community’s ability to protect civilians and 
respond to gross human rights abuses like ethnic cleansing and genocide.  Unfortunately, the two 
principles do not always readily go together. 
 The basic reason that impartiality and a responsibility to protect will often come into conflict is 
that political agreements in postconflict situations represent an accommodation among armed factions, 
                                                 
12 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome (UN Document number A/RES/60/1, New York: 
United Nations, 2005), §138-140, 30.  The outcome document was adopted without a vote (by consensus). 
13 ICISS, 13. 
14 ICISS, 35. 
15    ICISS, 15. 
16 ICISS, 36. 
17    ICISS, 17. 
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or at least among factions that can already exert a degree of power and control over continued violence, 
rather than arrangements that are driven by respect for the interests of the larger population. 
 The possibility that an agreement that is acceptable to the parties will not respect the welfare of 
the broader population is not merely theoretical.  Examples of cases in which a peace agreement looks 
like a devil’s bargain are not hard to find – take, for instance, the Darfur region of Sudan.  
 As of this writing, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), concluded in May of 2006, is the basis 
of the African Union peace operation in the Sudan (AMIS), and will likely be the basis of any UN 
operation.  The agreement was negotiated by representatives of the Sudanese government and the 
various Darfurian rebel forces, and in the end was signed by only one rebel leader.18  The DPA does 
contain provisions to initiate a “Darfur-Darfur dialog and consultation,” which would be a broader 
conference aimed at bringing in elements of the population not included in the DPA negotiations – but 
the dialog has only advisory authority, and the DPA gives the militant parties a potentially controlling 
role in its establishment.19  Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for the 
UN mission in (southern) Sudan (UNMIS) said that the “agreement does not resonate with the people 
of Darfur... [they perceive that it] has been forced upon them and, rather than meeting the interests of 
all parties somewhere halfway, only strengthens the position of the government and a minority 
tribe...”20  Indeed, as of October 2006 the DPA was still not being respected and the rebel group that 
signed stood accused of joining the government in attacks on civilians.21  
 Even where there is not a formal peace agreement around which the peace operation can be 
structured, as is the case with the US’ current involvement in Iraq, any viable political process will 
almost certainly represent a similar compromise among elites.  The US has found itself negotiating 
with various factions in Iraq rather than directly trying to oversee the welfare of the Iraqi people.  In 
Kosovo, the UN mission (UNMIK) exercised its administrative authority through a joint commission 
composed of members of the two rival Kosovar resistance movements, the LDK and KLA – meaning 
that administrators were appointed as spoils of peace between the two groups, rather than selected as 
representatives of the people.22
 The groups with which peace operations must negotiate typically enjoy some popular support.  
But that does not make them representatives of “the people” in any meaningful sense.  The relationship 
between an agreement that satisfies the interests of various power elites in a conflict and the interests of 
the people who have suffered from that conflict will always be tenuous and contingent.  At best, the 
people’s interest in escaping violence will be served and some of their other interests may be aligned 
with those of the elites.  At worst, a peace agreement may place the people under the authority of local 
tyrants.  To the extent that a peace operation is “partial to the peace agreement” when it represents the 
interests of armed elites, it may actually be engaged in creating and supporting a system for the 
oppression of the people it was deployed to assist.  
                                                 
18 International Crisis Group, Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement, Africa Briefing No. 39 (Nairobi/Brussels: International 
Crisis Group, 2006), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/b039_darfur_s_fragile_peace_agreement.pdf 
(accessed on October 27, 2006), 2. 
19 International Crisis Group, Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement, 10. 
20 Jan Pronk, remarks on his blog of 28 June 2006, http://www.janpronk.nl/index194.html (accessed on October 27, 2006). 
21 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Darfur: Korma: Yet More Attacks on Civilians, July 31, 2006, 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr540262006 (accessed on October 27, 2006). 
22 Michael J. Dziedzic, “Peace Operations in Kosovo,” (unpublished draft on file with author), 387. 
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Which should we Choose? 
 If I am right that it will not always (or perhaps even often) be possible for a peace operation 
both to be impartial and to fully discharge its responsibility to protect, the question becomes one of 
which should take priority.  It is tempting, from an ethical standpoint, to say “if the peace agreement 
does not represent the interests of the people, so much the worse for it – we should empower peace 
operations to defend people, not just oversee questionable compromises.”  Or, as an International Crisis 
Group’s report on Liberia and Sierra Leone more bluntly puts it, “thugs are thugs.”23   
 There are, regrettably, two difficulties with the straightforward “ethical” stance.  First, 
comprehensive protection of rights is not always a feasible goal for a peace operation.  Second, it may 
not even be conceptually possible for a peace operation to fully live up to an obligation to defend the 
people. 
Problem One: Can we do it? 
 The US/UN intervention in Somalia took a well-publicized turn for the worse in late 1993, but 
the seeds of the crisis were sown earlier.  In March 1993, the leaders of the major Somali factions 
signed two peace agreements.  The first established a Transitional National Council (TNC), as well as 
local representative mechanisms, but did not specify how members of any of the transitional bodies 
were to be selected.  The second specified a process for choosing TNC members that essentially 
distributed political power between the 15 major armed factions.  The UN mission (UNOSOM II) 
chose to ignore the second agreement and implement the first.24
 UNOSOM II sought to broker a more representative political process and rebuild the country’s 
judicial apparatus in a way that circumvented General Mohamed Farah Aideed’s Somali National 
Alliance (SNA), one of the most influential but also vicious warring factions.  It also instituted a fairly 
aggressive approach to disarmament.  Unsurprisingly, this approach was not to Aideed’s liking.  Things 
started going seriously downhill when Pakistani troops carried out a weapons inspection at Aideed’s 
radio station in June, leading to SNA attacks on the inspectors and other Pakistanis at a feeding station.  
The UN and US forces decided to strike back at Aideed and the SNA, and the conflict ultimately led to 
the 3 October 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident that spurred the US withdrawal from Somalia.25  
William Durch's analysis concluded that: 
... UNOSOM II had three potentially viable options: serve as an honest broker among the factions (as 
opposed to Somali society at large); openly side with a faction or factions; or get out fast.  Instead, it 
chose to function as arbiter of Somali politics and champion of the disempowered “Somali people...”26
 Serving as an honest broker among factions would have been the impartial course of action; 
instead, UNOSOM II attempted to fulfill its “responsibility to protect” more directly (though the phrase 
was not current at the time).  The Somalia intervention was not scuttled merely because of the 
particular run-in with Aideed’s forces; the approach was unsound.  As Durch's analysis goes on to point 
out, had Aideed been defeated, the international forces would then simply have been faced with 
defeating the next most powerful warlord, and the next, and the next.  I would point out in addition that 
even if all the extant militias had been defeated, this would still not have left UNOSOM II dealing 
                                                 
23 ICG, Liberia and Sierra Leone, 22. 
24 William J. Durch, “Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and ‘State-Building’ in Somalia,” in Durch, ed., 
UN Peacekeeping, 331. 
25 Durch, “Introduction to Anarchy,” 340-347. 
26 Durch, “Introduction to Anarchy,” 351 (emphasis in original). 
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directly with “the people” - either new militias would have sprung up, or (less likely) the operation 
would have faced a situation of total chaos and a largely atomized population.  Militant factions may 
not be representatives of the people in the relevant sense, but they are nothing more or less than some 
of the people, organized.  As I will discuss in more detail in the next section, making a distinction 
between political organizations and “the people” is a dangerous moves – it may be (problematic) 
organizations all the way down. 
 The difficulty of taking the side of “the people” was not unique to Somalia. The International 
Crisis Group criticized Sierra Leone’s Lomé Peace Agreement on the grounds that it “placed war 
criminals on the same level as elected governments and international mediators.”27  The Agreement 
made deep concessions to the facts on the ground in Sierra Leone: Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) was in control of nearly half the country, including much of the diamond-
producing area.  The agreement partially ratified this control, and legitimated the RUF despite its 
history of rights abuses, by granting Sankoh a cabinet position in charge of mineral exploitation.28
 Much as it makes one queasy to contemplate concessions to a group like the RUF, known for 
grievous human rights abuses, later events showed the importance of the compromise to the peace.    In 
2000, when the UN mission (UNAMSIL) attempted to move into RUF-controlled diamond-producing 
areas, the RUF resisted and captured UNAMSIL troops and their vehicles – only a forceful intervention 
by UK forces prevented a “humiliating collapse” of the mission.29   
 In this case, a combination of military force and outside economic pressure was able to bring a 
resolution that excluded the most egregious spoiler.  But this means that the formal oversight of Sierra 
Leone diamond was handed to another power elite, the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, not given 
to “the people.”  This arrangement does not seem to have resulted in Sierra Leone’s diamond wealth 
being more equitably spent on its people.  Several months after the “successful”30 completion of 
UNAMSIL’s mandate, “Sierra Leone’s diamond mining areas are among the poorest and least 
developed in the impoverished country,” and illegal diamond exports remain common (though there 
has been progress on the latter).31
 Most conflict resolutions will have a compromise character, if they are at all successful.  The 
goal of a peace agreement is primarily to bring peace, and this does not necessarily require creating a 
just regime, but rather one that is at least minimally acceptable to the conflicting parties.  An attempt to 
impose a resolution that comports better with the intervener’s sense of what would be just risks being a 
resolution that does not satisfy the parties to the conflict sufficiently to end the fighting.  This problem 
is unlikely to be overcome even by an increase in the military capacity of the peace operation.  No 
peace operation is likely to wield more raw military force than the US-led invasion of Iraq, but even 
                                                 
27 International Crisis Group, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, Africa Report No. 87 (Dakar/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, 2004), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/west_africa/087_liberia_and_sierra_leone_rebuilding_failed_states.
pdf (accessed on October 27, 2006), 21. 
28 James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brtt Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina, The 
UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 2005), 132. 
29 Dobbins et al, 140. 
30 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “UNAMSIL,” 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/index.html (accessed on October 27, 2006). 
31 Partnership for Africa Canada and Network Movement for Justice and Development, Diamond Industry Annual Review: 
Sierra Leone 2006 (Ottawa, Canada and Freetown, Sierra Leone: Partnership for Africa Canada and Network Movement 
for Justice and Development, 2006), http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond/2006/0206review.pdf 
(accessed on October 27, 2006), 11. 
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there the coalition forces have found themselves needing to make deals among the competing factions, 
rather than being able to impose an idealized democracy from the top down. 
 Even if we scale back our expectations, and focus only on the truly egregious human rights 
abuses of the Responsibility to Protect, it may not be practically possible for a peace operation to side 
with their protection where it conflicts with a realistic peace agreement.  No peace operation will have 
the capacity and coverage of a complete national police force.  Even transitional administrations, such 
as in Kosovo or East Timor, have not exercised control comparable to that of a well-functioning state.  
If one or more parties to a conflict have not been convinced to end their abuses by a peace deal, the 
peace operation will find itself in a situation where it protects civilians in limited areas, but serious 
abuses can continue wherever its attention is not directed.  Protecting civilians from large-scale discrete 
human rights abuses, such as genocidal assaults, with military force may be possible.  And peace 
operations surely have a valuable role in providing protection to civilians under “imminent threat” in 
their areas of deployment.32  Welcome work is being done on how best to design peace operations to 
accomplish these tasks.33  But tamping down mass violence or protecting civilians who cross path with 
a peace operation is a different task from providing comprehensive human rights protections for all 
people throughout a country or region. 
 In most cases, the best way to ensure comprehensive protection of individuals’ rights is to 
establish a reasonably well-functioning government.  Even stable, but otherwise odious, regimes tend 
to engage in fewer truly heinous abuses of rights than one sees in weak states or civil conflicts (cold 
comfort as that may be).  In any event, the military aspect of a peace operation cannot simply walk in 
and set up a wonderful regime – the most plausible route to a good regime will often be to use military 
assurances to buttress a stable situation and then use political, economic, and diplomatic pressures to 
reform it. 
 There may be much that can be negotiated after the country is secured.  But this should not 
make us morally complacent about the initial compromises.  The factions are unlikely to respond well 
to any modifications of the political process that strip them of power.  At the very least, serious 
modifications away from the initial compromise will likely need to wait until after comprehensive 
disarmament (which may never truly happen), by which time the factions will typically be well-
ensconced in positions of political power. 
Problem Two: Does it Make Sense? 
 My comment about the need for political systems to comprehensively protect rights point to a 
deeper problem.  The discourse of the responsibility to protect can make the task of protecting people 
seem deceptively easy by limiting the scope of the responsibility to only the most serious rights abuses.  
It can also make the task of protecting people seem deceptively clear. 
 Human rights norms, whether we think of them as what is listed in various international 
instruments, or derive them from moral theory, tend to be specified at a very high level of abstraction.  
Even something like a right to life can be trickier than it seems.  It would be a mistake to think that a 
peace agreement or reconciliation process would eliminate violence entirely, since all states use violent 
                                                 
32 This limited civilian protection role is becoming a common element in authorizing mandates for UN peacekeeping 
operations.  See, e.g., the Secuirty Council resolution authorizing an extension of the mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), S/RES/1291 (February 24, 2000), 4. 
33 See, e.g., Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?, (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 
forthcoming 2006). 
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coercion from time to time to enforce their laws.  This makes the distinction between a human rights 
abuse and legitimate state coercion difficult to specify in many instances.  Does the right to life rule out 
all executions?  If not, surely it rules out arbitrary or extrajudicial executions – but then, what is 
arbitrary?  How good do the laws need to be before an international force should consider them 
acceptable?  My point is not to imply that questions like these have no answers; I think they do.  But 
they are highly contentious, often sensitive to the nuances of context, and so precisely the sorts of 
things that are generally left, in political situations, for individual states and their people to decide. 
 The other problem is that, while the ICISS is careful to stress in their report that the 
responsibility to protect does not call for military intervention in the case of ‘mere’ tyranny that does 
not rise to the level of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or the like, a peace operation should certainly not be 
in the business of supporting tyranny once an intervention has taken place.  Less egregious forms of 
human rights abuses, such as ethnic discrimination, political disenfranchisement, police brutality, and 
so forth may occur under a political system that represents a compromise among elites.  It would, at the 
very least, be something of a hollow victory if a peace operation were to intervene and succeed in 
securing a peace that allowed the powerful to get on with the business of oppressing the population.  
Ideally, the political situation established by a peace operation should be responsive to and respectful of 
the people at large. 
 Whether we talk about the “will of the people” or use some slightly less metaphysical phrase, 
like representativeness or democracy, peace operations will rarely be in a position to identify what ‘the 
people’ want.  Peace operations are, by definition, deployed into situations in which political structures 
have collapsed (or been disrupted by the intervention itself) or otherwise become unable to contain 
conflict in a peaceful manner. Traditional peace operations deployed themselves between two states 
that were unable to resolve their differences peacefully, while contemporary operations tend to operate 
where internal state structures have collapsed or become instruments of political violence.  In the 
absence of those structures, it is not only difficult to determine the will of the people, it is not clear that 
it exist, as I will now explain. 
 The theoretical problems with determining what an amorphous group like “the people” are 
fairly well-known and I will only briefly review them here.  I will also bracket problems regarding 
which group of individuals constitutes the relevant “people” - I will assume (probably too 
simplistically) that the population of the state or states involved in the conflict is the relevant group. 
 There is no general and unobjectionable way to transform the individual preferences of a 
group’s members into a preference of the group.  Any method of preference-aggregation will, in some 
cases, either generate a bizarre aggregate preference, or fail to generate a unique group preference.  
Different ways of aggregating individual preferences – most of them plausible: pairwise comparisons, 
adding up ranked preferences, etc. - will give different answers as to what the “group” preference is, 
even leaving all individuals’ preferences the same.34  In some cases, especially when the choice is only 
between two options, any reasonable way of aggregating preferences will give the same answer.  But in 
others (and how many situations have only two options?), there will be no unequivocal way to look at a 
group of people with individual preferences and say what they, as a group, want. 
 Things are made worse if we resist equating the people’s will with unreconstructed preferences.  
Normally, democratic theorists require at least some level of education, knowledge, and lack of 
                                                 
34 An extended discussion of the problems with various aggregative methods can be found in William H. Riker, Liberalism 
Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (Prospects 
Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1982), chs. 2-5. 
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coercion on individuals’ preferences in order to count any aggregation of them justified.  In cases 
where a peace operation has intervened to protect a people, these conditions are unlikely to be met – it 
would not be ideal for a peace operation to support a government that came to power through the 
people’s choice, if that choice was constrained by intimidation or prejudice.  This is one reason that 
holding elections is not a panacea for the problems of supporting a peace agreement among armed 
factions – merely allowing the people to express their unrevised preferences may, in a situation where 
the political structures that protect individuals from violence and oppression are still weak, simply 
cause people to elect those who already hold power, out of fear of retaliation.  Thus, in Bosnia’s first 
elections, many of the same nationalist politicians whose exploitation of ethnic divides fueled the war 
were returned to office,35 and Charles Taylor won Liberia’s 1997 elections with a campaign slogan of 
“he killed my ma, he killed my pa, I’ll vote for him.”36  Requiring elections, even where they are “free 
and fair,” does not automatically reconcile the political compromise of a peace with the interests of the 
people. 
 Or, we may not want to identify the people’s will with something as passive as preferences, 
even enlightened ones.  This does not help either – how does a people act?  There are some large-scale 
spontaneous events such as mass protests and uprisings that it makes sense to think of as acts of the 
people, but they are rare.  The most typical way that a people acts is through its institutions of 
governance.  Given the problems with translating individual preferences into aggregate preferences, it 
also makes sense to regard the people’s preference as in part a function of its institutional expression.  
If I say, “the American people elected George W. Bush as president in 2004,” my claim makes sense in 
part because there was an institutionalized process of voting.  The operation of institutions is not how I 
determine what the people did, it is how the people act.  In conflict situations, the parties to the conflict 
may be the closest thing present to the people, organized for action. 
 Since peace operations deploy into an areas where political institutions have become 
dysfunctional, they cannot generally make respecting the will of the people a priority.  The will of the 
people does not yet exist to be discovered in such situations.  It may be clear that allowing two warring 
factions to create a government that divides the nation as spoils is permitting tyranny.  But that does not 
mean it is clear what political arrangement would not be tyrannical.  Insisting on a Western-style 
democracy – thin forms focused solely on elections will tend to rubber-stamp whatever power relations 
are already in place, and thick forms of democracy incorporating the intervener’s own political ideals 
may themselves be tyrannical if those ideals are not shared by the local population.  That last is not to 
say that human rights are relative, or anything of the sort – but a political system could be tyrannical, 
even if it is a tyranny of the good.  The problem is not that the system might incorporate bad ideals, just 
that the ideals would not be those of the people for whom it is designed. 
What do We Do About It? 
 If my argument above is correct, peace operations (or at least their military aspects) should 
generally focus on supporting the peace process, not on protecting the people.  This is a bitter pill, but it 
more reasonably reflects the ability of a military force entering a conflict where the institutional 
structures of political will have collapsed than an injunction, however noble, to take the side of the 
people against their various foes.  One response is for the military aspect of a peace operation to punt 
                                                 
35 James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga 
Timilsina, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 
2003), 101. 
36 “Liberia: Goodbye to All That?” The Economist, 14 August 2003. 
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questions of political justice. Once the situation is stabilized, the political situation may be improvable 
through non-military means.  Even if it is not, at least fewer people will die. 
 Unfortunately, the choices made during the military peace-consolidation process can have an 
impact down the line, and significantly constrain what later political processes (except perhaps in the 
very long run) can achieve.  Once a particular regime is in place that represents a degree of 
compromise between the armed powers, it will tend to perpetuate their dominance and keep them close 
to the tools of violence that they could use to crush competitors or re-start the war.  This problem is 
exacerbated by the tendency of the international community to focus on getting a power-sharing 
arrangement and/or reasonably fair elections in place, and then leaving rather than working to more 
deeply transform the political arrangements. 
 If the military phase is to accomplish anything that would make the bitter pill of choosing 
impartiality over protection go down easier, the first step is to put a slightly finer point on what’s bad 
about a peace process that gives political power to the armed elites, even if they can be made to remain 
peaceful in its exercise. 
Non-domination 
 The particular vice to which peace agreements are subject is domination – the potential that the 
factions given power in the post-conflict political system will be able to exercise that power arbitrarily 
, without reference to the interests of the broader population.  The classical source for thinking about 
domination is Machiavelli, but the more modern non-domination approaches of Philip Pettit and Ian 
Shapiro are more congenial here. 
 Power, of course, is nearly inescapable.  Arbitrary power is power that can be exercised at the 
whim of the power-holder, who is not bound either by effective rules or by accountability to those over 
whom power is exercised.  Arbitrary power forces its targets to become servile, doing whatever they 
can to please the holders of power, because there are no limits on how their wrath might be exercised.  
The “republican” ideal is a life free from domination, in which each person is subject only to power 
that he or she can understand, predict, and exercise some control over.37
 The main bulwark that Pettit provides against domination is contestability.38  The role of 
political institutions, including democratic institutions like elections, is to allow the people over whom 
power is exercised to contest the use of that power – to register their discontent with particular uses, or 
general rules instituted for the use of power, and to be able to hold power-wielders accountable to at 
least some extent if their complaints are not dealt with.  Pettit’s notion of contestation even allows for 
some degree of veto if no compromise can be found; the ultimate form of contestation is opting out of 
the power structure – for a group within a state, internal autonomy or outright secession.  Secessionist 
movements are often one of the causes of the situations peace operations try to resolve, so support for 
the extreme form of contestation is not generally an option. 
 Shapiro offers a similar remedy for domination, insisting that deliberation be required whenever 
a political decision threatens the basic interests (the essentials for surviving as independent agents)39.  
Deliberation’s partisans claim many virtues for it, but in Shapiro’s argument one of its most important 
functions is to, like contestation, allow grievances to be aired and enforce some degree of delay.  It is 
                                                 
37 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 52-56. 
38 Pettit, 63. 
39 Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003), 43-45. 
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this domination-deflecting aspect of deliberation that I will focus on here. 
 An advantage of contestation and deliberation over other concepts, like representation, is that 
they are direct institutional suggestions – they recommend safeguard procedures rather than 
metaphysical properties of the system.  So they provide a helpful basis for thinking about how to design 
peace operations and their mandates. Of course, deliberation and contestation do not work perfectly 
even in the best-established, most democratic, and most respectful political systems.  Thus, it would be 
unreasonable to expect a peace operation to somehow give the people it is trying to assist full avenues 
for them through judicious exercise of military force.   
Political Space 
 A more reasonable goal would be for the military operation to open up “political space” in the 
same way that military force is often used to open “humanitarian space.”  In non-domination terms, this 
would mean not trying to help individuals and groups air their grievances and hold the power of armed 
elites in check so much as prevent those elites from interfering if individuals attempt to contest power 
(and  perhaps protect non-military groups such as international political party organizations that are in 
the business of helping with such things).  Unfortunately, even humanitarian space is not entirely 
unproblematic, and political space is significantly more dangerous. 
 Humanitarian provision can be politically sensitive in a conflict situation.  If you feed my 
enemy, you strengthen her, and thus threaten me.  This perception no doubt explains in part why 
violent groups still attempting to win militarily will sometimes target or attempt to drive out 
humanitarian workers (as has been done, e.g., by parties to the current conflict in Darfur40).  
Humanitarian aid groups typically mitigate the danger that supplying someone’s enemy puts them in by 
maintaining a posture of scrupulous neutrality (in a sense that comports fairly closely with the UN’s 
traditional use of the term).  But while the link between humanitarian aid and political power can be 
weakened or broken, political space just is about protecting individuals’ ability to gain political power.  
There is no link to be broken, and so providing political space very quickly threatens to unsettle the 
political compromise underlying peace. 
 So we find peace operations with two conflicting desiderata.  On the one hand, effective 
contestation requires that people who dissent from the policies of the emerging regime be able to 
acquire the political power necessary to hold the elites accountable and potentially influence outcomes.  
On the other, the peace operation is there to consolidate a peace process that embodies a compromise 
among elites liable to be upset by anyone or any group gaining that kind of power. 
 If there is a way out of this trap, it is through the relatively small amount of power that 
contestation requires.  Allowing a group to grow that can contest the power exercised against it is not 
the same as allowing for a group that could plausibly seize power on its own.  To democratic ears, the 
idea of taking a course of action that explicitly rules out allowing some minority group or set of 
dissenters to take control of their own destiny may sound odious; but to an armed elite, it will hopefully 
sound crucially non-threatening. 
Freedom of Association and Impartial Ground 
 Generally speaking, the way to gain enough political power to effectively contest is through 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Darfur: Aid Workers Under Threat,” Press Release  (April 5, 2005), 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/05/darfur10417.htm (accessed on November 8, 2006). 
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organization.  This means that a right of association should be elevated in importance to sit alongside 
rights to life, freedom from torture, and the like, in our thinking about peace operations. 
 If there are unarmed, but well-organized groups already existing in the society, providing 
political space may primarily be a matter of preventing the parties to the conflict from using their new 
political power to disrupt those organizations. 
 On the other hand, if there are not existing organized political groups (or if the extant groups 
still leave some individuals or groups subject to domination), a more assertive sort of political space 
may need to be opened.  Merely preventing direct disruption of attempts to organize (such as through 
defending freedom of movement) may not suffice as political space any more than merely preventing 
militias from snatching food from people’s mouths would provide humanitarian space.  Providing 
humanitarian space may also mean providing secure food storage areas, protecting people traveling to 
places where potable water is available, etc.  Where people are unorganized, certain kinds of positive 
support may be needed from the peace operation to give them an effective option of becoming 
organized. 
 Political organization, like almost anything else, takes resources.  For instance, it requires 
means of communication and specialized knowledge.  Most of those resources necessary are most 
appropriately supplied by non-military elements of the peace operation; to a large extent, the military 
goal can be a negative one of ensuring that access to those resources is somewhat protected, and that a 
constituency is still around to receive them when the peace is consolidated enough to make more robust 
forms of outside political intervention more reasonable.  Some, however, are appropriately provided by 
the military element and are necessary to lay the groundwork for later political work. 
 The most crucial thing needed to support some form of contestation-enabling political 
organization, and which can be appropriately supplied by military elements of an intervention, is 
“impartial ground” on which individuals and groups can organize. 
 I've adopted the concept of impartial ground from Karol Soltan's work on the importance of 
“neutral ground”, who explains that neutral ground “can include institutions of various kind... , as well 
as persons, groups, ideas, places and even objects which are seen as neutral within the most important 
and divisive conflicts in a country.”41  The neutrality of neutral ground is a matter of treating all parties 
fairly, by some standard that sits above the relevant conflicts.  As such, Soltan means “neutrality” much 
more like the way I have used “impartiality” - hence the slight terminological shift in this essay. 
 The impartial ground established by a peace operation should have two characteristics.  First, it 
will often literally be ground, space.  An under-appreciated resource for political organization is 
physical space.  Groups wanting to organize so as to articulate their grievances and contest the 
powerful in an effective way often need to be able to come together, meet face to face, discuss their 
options, and build relationships of mutual trust and understanding.  Technological advances, such as 
the internet, may remove this constraint in some cases.  But access to such technology will be limited in 
the typical peace operation’s' environment – and it bears noting that even groups in high-tech societies  
usually set aside some time to meet in person.  Providing physical space for early potential political 
organization is something that is well within the reasonable reach of a peace operation.  In many cases, 
the relevant space may be provided incidental to other tasks – such as protecting displaced persons' 
camps or safe areas.  If those spaces are not relevant, smaller ad hoc spaces could be set up without a 
peace operation going too far out of its way (if there are very large numbers of people who seek some 
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form of protection from the peace operation, that will effectively be a displaced persons flow, and can 
be dealt with in the same – imperfect but not unusual – ways that any movement of displaced persons is 
handled). 
 The element that bears more attention is the question of impartiality in this context.  As Soltan 
notes, impartiality is always both between some parties and relevant to those important and divisive 
conflicts and the social life of the area.42  So the question is: what sort of impartiality could the 
impartial ground established by a peace operation adhere to that would make it a resource for those 
who might otherwise be dominated by the peace agreement? 
 We are already assuming that the peace operation has made it past the point of containing 
battlefield violence by the time that these subtler questions of domination become a problem.  Violent 
coercive power exercised by the emerging regime (or even the peace operation itself) in support of the 
new order’s laws remains a serious problem, since those laws may be arbitrary with respect to 
significant elements of the population.  So the relevant sort of impartiality in this case seems to be an 
impartiality about laws and rules. 
 The question is not unlike that faced by UN transitional administrations in situations like 
Kosovo.  The UN mission there (UNMIK) was charged, in part, with administering law and order.  
This raised a sticky question – which law?  Kosovo antebellum law was created by the Serbians in 
1989 and was viewed as an instrument of oppression by the Kosovar Albanians.  Previous to 1989, 
Kosovo had enjoyed an autonomous status in Yugoslavia, and Kosovar Albanians much preferred a 
return to that code – but that was unacceptable to the Serbs, whose sovereignty over Kosovo the UN 
was intent on respecting (which sovereignty, in the context of this essay, it should be noted was a major 
Serb casus belli).  UNMIK decided to enforce the laws extant in 1999, which was “considered odious 
by Kosovo Albanians,” until a crisis of compliance led the UN to revert the law to its 1989 status.43
 At one point, UNMIK contemplated simply issuing a temporary code covering only the most 
serious crimes.  While in the case of Kosovo that solution may have been perceived as ad hoc, and 
worse in terms of the administration's legitimacy than choosing either local code, the idea has potential 
for thinking about impartial ground.  A way of establishing the relevant sort of impartiality to provide 
political space for groups or individuals looking to resist domination would be for the UN to establish, 
on the basis of the charter and international legal practices (such as the Fourth Geneva Convention 
provisions for occupying forces44), a minimalist “model” legal code.  This could then be applied in any 
areas under formal or de facto jurisdiction of a UN-approved or -led peace operation – such as the 
physical spaces that could serve as impartial ground.  This is to some extent the way things work in 
actual operations, though there is often a push to hand over control of areas like displaced persons 
camps to local forces45 – precisely what my analysis implies we should not do.  An explicit 
commitment and clear code would help clarify things. 
 In fact, the Brahimi Report noted the need to clarify the applicable law for UN transitional 
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administrations, and recommended the creation of an “interim criminal code” for cases in which the 
UN is expected to take over administration of law and order.46  While an initial working group 
convened by the SG considered the idea of a interim code infeasible, the project was taken up by the 
United States Institute of Peace (USIP), which presented a draft code in 2003.47  The USIP’s Model 
Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice project plans to release a final package of codes in 2006.48
 While such codes would be welcome, my suggestion here is in some ways more modest.  A 
military operation will not be in a position to enforce even a fairly simple transitional code.  In a 
situation in which the basic security situation has not been consolidated, the actors on the ground will 
be soldiers and, at best, military police – not judges and civilian police.  An even more minimal code, 
covering only the worst offenses and straightforward enough both in its rules and imposition to be used 
by troops would be a worthwhile supplement.  At the very least, the considerations I have advanced 
here indicate that any model code should be made available (perhaps in simplified form) to the non-
police members of a peacekeeping mission, in addition to its rule of law components.  In addition, we 
should not think of the model code as useful only in transitional administration situations – many other 
peace operations will have some role, formal or informal, as alternative guarantors of law and order.   If 
the military aspect of an intervention is not prepared to enforce a neutral code in its area of control 
from the start, we risk much damage being done by indigenous forces executing a dominating set of 
rules before rule of law reform or transitional administration can take hold.  
 
 Physical spaces in which coercive force was only used to enforce a minimal code independent 
of the arrangements in the peace agreement are precisely the sort of areas that would allow some space 
for nascent organization against domination, and could ultimately serve as spaces in which non-military 
actors could carry out deeper political projects once the peace had matured.  An appropriate code 
should not be conceived of as a full set of legal rules, but rather as a minimal set of rules for 
maintaining rough order that could be implemented by military police or similar personnel.  An 
effective and impartial code should be developed in advance and clearly promulgated both in general 
an in areas of operations. 
 
 Some caveats are in order.  It is very important that the peace operation ensure that these areas 
do not become overly threatening to the parties to the agreement.  Since they are by definition under 
the peace operations' control, one important way of doing this is to prevent any arms inflows.  If 
significant arms are already present in the area, the peace operation cannot expect parties to the conflict 
to respect them as impartial ground nor should they declare them such until the area can be disarmed. 
 In addition, while the peace operation should not allow any of the parties to enforce their laws 
(even those agreed upon for the new regime) within the impartial area, it should allow their agents to 
come and go so long as this does not compromise the peace.  This may well have a chilling effect on 
some forms of organization, but that chill can be mitigated both by effective peace operation defense of 
the ground's impartiality and by later more comprehensive political action.  The military phase's goal is 
not full-blooded contestation, but merely the preservation of enough political space to prevent armed 
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elites from effectively snuffing it during consolidation of the peace.  The peace operation needs to take 
action to assure those on the impartial ground that they can organize themselves and air grievances 
without undue fear, but also to assure the parties that they will not allow a group to organize in such a 
way that it could upset the peace process. 
 As a corollary, we need to bite the bullet about certain limitations of the political space 
provided.  If, for instance, anyone seeking to organize politically would face serious abuses as soon as 
they left the immediate protection of the peace operation, effective political space will only be able to 
be provided them if they are willing and able to live in an area under protection (such as a refugee 
camp).  A peace operation can protect freedom of movement in many cases, but cannot assure the 
safety in general of political dissidents outside its immediate area of control – this would amount to 
attempting comprehensive rights protection all over again. 
 Finally, it must be understood by the peace operation, by the parties, and by anyone on the 
impartial ground, that the arrangement is strictly temporary.  The generic code established should be 
clearly minimal, not a comprehensive legal system.  A military force will not be equipped to undertake 
serious investigations or trials, even if we include police elements of a peace operation as “military.”  
Most likely, the one-size-fits-all response will be a brief hearing and then detention.  The provision of 
impartial ground is intended as a stopgap measure to ensure that there is some political space for the 
beginnings of a political reconciliation process that will go well beyond the peace agreement once a 
peace is secured, and hence well beyond what the military aspect of the operation can reasonably 
concern itself with.  Ultimately, any dissenters will have to contest what they see as domination 
through political systems that the population will create in conjunction with internationals – impartial 
ground of the sort I am advocating is a precursor to that process, not a replacement for it.  Emphasizing 
the temporary character of the generic code's applicability will, hopefully, induce local groups to use 
the opportunity for organizing that it provides to prepare for a politically integrated future. 
Conclusions and Problems 
 It may be objected that even this proposal is unrealistic.  I do not think it always will be, at least 
in the long term; but I also think that we should be realistic about when it is not. 
 The republican ideal is relatively undemanding – in the limited form appropriate to the 
resources of a military intervention, the goal is to protect individuals from the worst excesses of a 
potentially-dominating government, rather than accomplish anything more lofty, like making it an 
instrument of the people.   As much as possible, the overall goal should be to encourage (and, beyond 
the military component, facilitate) people finding ways to live within the regime established by the 
peace process. 
 In one sense, what these considerations show is how little we can really expect out of an 
intervention’s military aspect.  A military intervention might be able to stop mass killing.  But without 
a political settlement, no matter how imperfect from the standpoint of justice, it will not be able to 
secure comprehensive safety for a population, and that makes the military quite beholden to the quality 
of agreement that the armed parties are willing to make.  If the peace of the armed is unjust, a military’s 
only constructive role is likely to be to shield some of the population from the worst injustices and hope 
that non-military aspects of an intervention can improve the regime whose security it is attempting to 
establish. 
 The worst-case scenario for an attempt to provide impartial ground as I have described it is one 
in which the parties are so frightened of any organized political dissent, even by the relatively small 
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and unarmed groups my proposal would protect, that they will meet the possibility with a return to 
violence.  I am not sure that any peace could be both stable and acceptable to the international 
community under such conditions, however.  A government that could crush all dissent and remain 
stable would be extremely repressive – and, for what it is worth, the international community has 
shown both a commitment to and some success in at least enforcing minimal forms of democracy 
where it has supported a peace agreement. 
 Even if a peace operation can do no better than stabilizing a problematic peace agreement, we 
should not let lofty moral ideals tempt us to look too far down our noses at it.  Peace, even an unjust 
peace, is still often better than violence.  Non-domination can look like a subtle luxury in the face of 
the horrors of conflict.  But neither should we members of the international community be too ready to 
pat ourselves on the back for achieving mere stability.  A clear-sighted appreciation for the way in 
which peacekeeping may dominate the population will, I hope, at least make planners aware of the 
need to find ways to mitigate any moral drawbacks a peace may have. 
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